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Norman Barber and Helen Barber, husband and wife. 
DEFENDANTS 
The Emporium Partnership, 
a Utah Limited Partnership. 
Individual Alleged Partners: 
Von K. Stocking 
Don A. White, Jr. 
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE(S) 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
RELEVANT LAW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . - , . = . . . . , . . . 11 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Dairy Distributors, Inc., v. Local 976, Western Conference 
of Teamsters, 12 U2d 85, 396 P2d 47 7 
TREATISES; 
60 AmJur 2d at 240 10 
STATUTES; 
Section 15-1-14 UCA 1953 2, 5, 7 
RULES: 
Rule 4, URAP 1 
Rule 6, URAP 6 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants appeal an Order dated December 1, 1986, by First 
District Court Judge, VeNoy Christoffersen, denying Defendants' 
Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution. Subsequent to that Order, 
Defendants filed on December 2, 1986, a Rule 52(b) Objection to 
Form of Order. 
Defendants moved that the Writ of Execution be quashed on 
the basis that a judgment rendered on April 18, 1979, be declared 
not to bear interest thereon and that therefore the Writ was in 
excess of the judgment. 
Plaintiffs specifically dispute that this appeal is timely. 
Further, that the court's jurisdiction of this appeal has been 
properly invoked. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to responding to the issues raised by 
Defendants, Plaintiffs consider the following issues relevant to 
this appeal: 
1. Was the appeal timely. 
2. Does the judgment bear interest. 
3. Are partnership issues applicable. 
RELEVANT LAW 
Rule 4 - URAP; 
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from 
the district court to the Supreme Court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the district court within 30 days after the date of 
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entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Section 15-1-14 UCA (1953): 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall 
conform thereto and shall bear interest agreed upon by 
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; 
other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants based upon a 
simple promissory note. Trial Record at 1-4. Defendant Emporium 
Partnership was determined to be a limited partnership, 
Defendants Malouf, White and Stocking were general partners. A 
copy of said note was attached to the Complaint. Trial Record at 
4. The complaint requested interest, attorney's fees plus 
principal of $15,000.00. Upon filing several affidavits 
Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings. Trial Record at 
13-14. 
Defendants resisted solely on the ground that no judgment 
could be rendered because Plaintiff Helen Barber was also a 
limited partner. Trial Record at 26-29. The court thereupon 
rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on April 18, 1979. 
Trial Record at 36-41. The judgment recites in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiffs have recovered judgment against the 
Defendants in the amount due on a promissory note in 
the amount of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars 
plus accrued interest at the rate of 12 percent per 
annum from date hereof until paid in the amount of 
Twenty-one Hundred Eighty ($2,180.00) Dollars, attorney 
fees in the amount of Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars 
and court costs in the amount of Thirty-one and 30/100 
($31.30) Dollars. 
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Thereafter Defendants moved to Amend the Judgment. One of 
the issues being raised in that motion was the basis for 
attorney's fees. Trial Record at 49-51. That motion was denied 
June 5, 1979. In the denial the court noted that its denial did 
not preclude the Defendants from raising issues as to enforcement 
methods or priorities relative to the partnership when the 
judgment is sought to be enforced. Trial Record at 59. The 
Memorandum Decision of May 21, 1979, upon which it was based 
stated: 
Defendant has filed a Motion for Amendment to the 
Judgment, Relief from Judgment and Stay of Execution. 
Generally the thrust of Defendants' argument goes to 
questions of how the judgment should be enforced and 
priorities in connection therewith. 
Therefore, Defendants' motion is denied, of course, 
without prejudice to take any appropriate action when 
*-he judgment is sought to be enforced 
Clearly the issues of interest and attorney's fees are not 
left open. Defendants filed no appeal from that Order. 
In 1982 Defendants attempted to Strike a Writ of Execution, 
alleging the Writ was erroneous because interest was being 
accrued on the judgment. See Motion to Strike Writ dated 
November 2, 1982, Trial Record at 101. In the Memorandum of 
October 28, 1982, the court again denied these Motions. Trial 
Record at 101. 
In December, 1982, the Defendants again raised the same 
issue in another Motion to Quash. Trial Record at 138,181. In 
response the court issued the Writ which included interest* 
Trial Record at 185-86, see also the Order of April 5, 1982, 
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Trial Record at 544, On August 19, 1986, again the Defendants 
raised the same issue. Trial Record at 206, 208-09, 256. This 
motion is again denied. Trial Record at 257-58. 
The Plaintiff appeals to this court the same issues decided 
by the lower court in 1979, 1982 and earlier in 1986 albeit by 
repetition in November 1986. That issue is whether the judgment 
bears interest. The amount of attorney's fees awarded and 
whether the Barbers can have a judgment where one of them is a 
limited partner are also appealed. The November 1986 Order only 
addresses the interest question. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the facts cited by the Appellants/Defendants are 
characterizations of the trial court's responses, memorandums and 
orders. Plaintiffs dispute that Defendants have accurately set 
forth the trial court's responses. Rather than belabor these 
points, Plaintiffs summarize the salient parts of the record as 
follows. 
Defendants mischaracterize the record in the following 
particulars: 
1. Judgment: The judgment is for the amount of the note 
plus accrued interest of $2,180.00 to the date of the judgment. 
Defendants mischaracterize interest as being a fixed amount and 
that no interest will ever thereafter accrue on the judgment. 
The language while somewhat unclear simply does not support 
Defendants' allegations, which are also ridiculous on their face. 
Trial Record at 40. 
4 
2. Order of June 5, 1979: Defendants argue that this order 
leaves open indefinitely the questions of attorney's fees, 
interest and whether indeed any judgment has been entered. It 
does not do this. It simply indicates with respect to 
enforcement mechanics they will be reviewed at the time they are 
attempted. Trial Record at 59, 
3. Court's Refusal to Address Issues: Defendants 
characterize the trial court as refusing to address issues. This 
is simply not the case. At some point the court simply began to 
refer Defendants to its previous orders or to limitations on 
their efforts to repeatedly reopen resolved issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Appeal Is Untimely. 
Defendants appeal issues resolved in decisions decided 
earlier which are past the stage where they can be appealed. 
The fact that the trial court repeats its same decision in an 
Order on December 1, 1986, is irrelevant. The appeal did not 
occur within the required time periods. 
II. The Judgment Does Bear Interest. 
Pursuant to Section 15-1-4 all judgments bear interest at 
either the legal rate or the rate agreed upon by the parties. 
The note provides for interest at 12 percent (12%) before and 
after judgment. 
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III. Partnership Issues Are Not Applicable. 
Partnership law simply does not support the theory that the 
Plaintiffs have no right to obtain a judgment on this amount. In 
any event this decision is clearly decided as of 1979 in this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Appeal Is Untimely. 
The four issues raised by Defendants on appeal were all 
resolved by the trial court in 1979. An appeal in 1987 is simply 
not timely under Rule 6 or any of the methods of extension 
thereunder. 
The first issue re^^.rdin^ i^ t'^ r^ t^ W9? decided in the 
Judgment in 1979 and confirmed in subsequent Orders. See 
discussion at pages 3-4 hereof. 
The second issue regarding attorney's fees was specifically 
raised by Defendant on May 21, 1979, in their Reply at Section 4. 
Trial Record at 57. That motion was denied in the Order of June 
5, 1979. Trial Record at 59. 
The third and fourth issues were raised before the judgment 
and resolved by it. Trial Record at 26-28, 30-32, 34-35, 39 and 
40. 
All of these issues have long been resolved and any appeal 
even in the face of manifest error would be untimely. 
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II. Judgments Do Bear Interest. 
Section 15-1-4 provides that judgments bear interest at the 
contract or legal rate. In Dairy Distributors, Inc., v. Local 
976, Western Conference of Teamsters, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that interest follows a judgment as a matter of law. 16 
Utah 2d 85, 396 P 2d 47. The Dairy case further held that a 
judgment did not need to recite that it would bear interest. 
Herein the promissory note provides for interest "before and 
after judgment" at twelve percent (12%). Trial Record at 4. The 
judgment recites that the interest is at twelve percent but does 
not specifically state that it continues to accrue after 
rendition of the judgment. Trial Record at 40. Defendants, in 
at best, a disingenuous argument, urge this court to misread the 
judgment to effect that only $2,180.00 interest will accrue from 
the date of the judgment until paid. That is the amount of pre-
judgment interest not post-judgment interest for no one knows the 
amount thereof in 1979. 
The reference to "date hereof" is not to the judgment but to 
the complaint alleging accrued interest of $2,180.00 to the date 
hereof [meaning the date of the complaint]. Trial Record at 1. 
Rather than haggle with the Defendants, Plaintiffs have allowed 
the $2,180.00 as being to the date of the judgment although that 
is mathematically incorrect. Trial Record at 256. In any event 
the judgment determines the amount owing as: 
$15,000.00 Principal 
2,180.00 Accrued Interest 
4,000.00 Attorney's Fees 
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31,30 Costs 
$21,211.30 Total Judgment 
It is from this figure which Plaintiffs have accrued 
interest at the contract rate of 12 percent (12%) as provided in 
the note and judgment. 
A careful reading of the judgment indicates that "the 
Plaintiffs have recovered judgment". It then recites the amount 
of interest as being $2,180.00. The words "have recovered" are 
used in the past or present tense as to the amount thereby 
awarded. It is not future and does not address what will 
thereafter accrue. 
III. Partnership Issues Are Not Applicable: 
Defendants attempt to raise various partneiship issues as 
the third and fourth issues on appeal. These issues don't appear 
related to the December 1, 1986, Order. They were foreclosed by 
the Judgment in 1979. Defendants are arguing the same issues 
they argued before the Judgment in 1979. 
In response, Plaintiffs simply stand on the argument made by 
Attorney B. H. Harris in his Reply to Defendants1 Response for 
Motion of Judgment on the Pleadings of 1979. These arguments are 
hereby incorporated herein as follows: 
1. In the first paragraph of Defendants' 
response, they attempt to have the court believe 
that at the time the Plaintiffs complaint was 
filed on January 17, 1979, in this matter, that 
both the Plaintiffs herein, were limited 
partners. Defendants offer a letter in evidence 
dated February 19, 1979, which is dated more than 
a month after the commencement of this action 
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claiming that this letter constitutes an apparent 
assignment by HELEN BARBER to her husband NORMAN 
BARBER of half interest in her limited 
partnership interest. 
It is academic that the legal rights and 
status of the parties are determined as of the 
date of the commencement of the action. The 
record is clear and beyond dispute at the time of 
the commencement of this action the plaintiff 
NORMAN BARBER had no interest whatever in the 
limited partnership. HELEN BARBER was the sole 
limited partner. See attached copy of the 
limited partnership agreement to Plaintiffs1 
complaint. 
The fact that Mrs. Barber expressed a desire 
in her letter of February 19, 1979, to have the 
limited partnership interest placed in both names 
does not constitute an assignment of her interest 
to her husband. Formal execution of an 
assignment would be required. Until this 
assignment was made and filed with the 
partnership, the partnership records must stand 
as originally created. The partnership records 
cannot be changed otherwise. 
2. As to the second paragraph of 
Defendants1 response, the Plaintiffs assert that 
the counsel for the Defendants is completely 
confused when he states that an attempt by 
Plaintiffs to recover a judgment for the loan 
made to the partnership, is an attempt to return 
part of this capital contribution of a limited 
partnership. The court can see that the loan of 
Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) Dollars to the 
partnership and a capital contribution of Forty 
Thousand ($40,000) Dollars by HELEN BARBER are 
separate and independent acts and have no 
relationship to one another. 
3. Throughout the pleadings and the 
Defendants1 memorandums filed in this matter, 
there is no question that the Defendants 
acknowledge that the loan of Fifteen Thousand 
($15,000) Dollars is represented by the 
Promissory Note. Defendants admit in fact, a 
loan made by the Plaintiffs to the partnership. 
Under the limited partnership of the State of 
Utah, it makes no difference whether the note is 
signed by two or all three of the general 
partners, as a note signed by any general 
partners for partnership business is binding on 
all the general partners. 
4. There is no question that under the Utah 
Limited Partnership Act that a limited partner 
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may loan funds to the partnership. 
5. Defendants assert in Paragraph 6 that 
before one partner can sue another partner there 
must be a general accounting and dissolution of 
the partnership. This certainly is not the law. 
This suit is based upon a separate isolated loan 
transaction. A debtor/creditor relationship that 
exists between the Plaintiffs and the separate 
from the capital interest in the partnership. 
It is the general rule that one partner may 
sue another at law on transactions between them 
as individuals involving matters not so connected 
to the partnership as to involve partnership 
accounting. 
60 Am Jur 2nd, page 240 states: "If one 
partner gives the other his Promissory Note or 
his separate acceptance on a partnership account, 
an action of law will lie on such note or bill 
since such instrument itself constitutes an 
acknowledgement of a separate debt.ff 
Footnote 20 at page 240 states: "A note 
given by one partner for a loan by his co-partner 
of his individual money to be used by the former 
in paying debt of a solvent partnership does not 
involve an accounting and therefore, an action of 
law may be maintained thereon." 
The Plaintiffs renew Lheii iecjacsL foi 
judgment upon the pleadings and ask the court to 
rule accordingly. 
Trial Record at 30-32 (footnotes omitted). 
Obviously, this issue has long since been foreclosed from 
appeal. In any event, the argument of Defendants lacks merit 
just as it did in 1979 when the trial court so ruled. 
CONCLUSION 
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Plaintiffs request this court to dismiss Defendants1 appeal 
because it is untimely. Plaintiffs further urge that the 
judgment does bear interest. Plaintiffs are not estopped from 
collecting the same because one of the Plaintiffs happened to be 
a limited partner as to other financial involvements with the 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs suggest to the court that Defendants have failed 
to file a cost bond on appeal pursuant to Rule 6. Plaintiffs 
further suggest that this is an appropriate case in which to 
enter a formal judgment for double costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rule 33, URAP. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 1987. 
DAINES & KANE 
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